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The Logic and Limits of Environmental 
Criminal Law in the Global Setting: 
Brazil and the United States-
Comparisons, Contrasts, and uestions in 
Search of a Robust Theory 
Robert F. Blomquist* 
Stnct but arguably unfair and counterproductiv~ systems of en/nina/ environmental law 
and enforcement exist in both the United States and Brazll in the twenty-first century. In order to 
create a sovereignty dividend encompassli1g the rule of law and evenhanded administrative control 
in the competitive global setting, both countries should rethink and refonn their respective systems 
of environmental en/nina/ law by seeking answers to several questions of legal philosophy in 
. 
search of a robust theory. 
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Environmental criminal law is the result of a legal evolutionary 
''process of transformation in response to the public's desire to have a_ 
legal system that better reflects the public's environmental protection 
goals."' Criminalizing environmental infractions and seeking appropriate 
sanctions for serious nortn violations of a nation's laws that seek to 
protect public health and ·natural resources is a vital role for government 
to play in a democratic polity. This is the overarching logic of national 
* © 20 II Robert F. Blomquist. Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. 
B . S. 1973, University of Pennsylvania (Wharton School); J.D. 1977, Cornell University. My 
thanks go to Professor Sebastian Elias of the San Andres University law faculty in Buenos Aires, 
Argentina, for allowing me to present an earlier version of this Article to his class and to other law 
faculty in March 2011. My thanks also go to international criminal law expert, Markus D. 
Dubber, and to two nationally recognized experts in American environmental criminal law, Walter 
D. James and Bruce Pasfie1d, for helpful comments as this Article was taking shape. My research 
assistant, Jon Sichtermann, helped me complete research for thi~ project. As always, my 
administrative assistant, Nancy Young, did an excellent job in preparing the manuscript. 
I. Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration ill the Evolution of 
Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 2407, 2419 ( 1995). 
83 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
84 ~.NTAL LAW JO [Vol.25:83 
environmental criminal law. Yet there is a .concomitant overarching limit 
as well: proper integration of two distinct bodies of law environmental 
rules and criminal sanctions into a balanced mosaic of clear enactment, 
evenhanded enforcement, and fair construction. In this regard, the 
legislature, the executive branch, and the judiciary should, "in their 
respective spheres of responsibility, consider the nature, aims, and limits 
of criminal law and how they relate to the underlying substantive 
offenses defined in the environmental statutes."2 
This Article is divided into three parts. Part I describes the 
difficulty of accommodating both criminal and environmental law in the 
environmental crimes programs of the United States over the last two 
decades and the costs of American nonintegration, which consist of 
inconsistent, inequitable, and politicized law enforcement. Part II then 
• 
considers Brazil's experience since the passage of the El)vironmental 
Crimes Law (Lei de Cnines Ambientais) of 1998 with the active 
prosecutorial involvement of the Brazilian Ministerio PUblico. Part III, 
finally, connects the experience of· the United States and Brazil in 
criminally prosecuting environmental crimes. A number of questions of 
comparison and contrast are raised about fairness, efficacy, and 
efficiency with some sketchy, tentative answers. 
• 
• 
I. · ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL LAW IN THE UNITE.D STATES 
• 
American criminal law, writ large, has received some recent 
theoretical criticism, which is relevant to the shape and functioning of 
environmental criminal law in the United States. Legal scholar and 
philosopher, Douglas Husak, in his 2008 book, Overcnininalization: The 
Limits of the Criminal Law,3 articulates what he calls a theory of· 
"cri.nllnal law minimalisni)4 to remedy "an injustice of monstrous 
proportions," wherein the quality of the criminal justice system in the 
United States has tarnished the "value of [the American] political 
community."5 Professor Husak claims that "the injustices associated with 
overcriminalization affect us all, rich and poor [Americans] alike."6 As 
he explains: "The two most distinctive characteristics of both federal and 
state systems of criminal justice in the United States during the past 
2. Jd at 2412. 
3. DOUGLAS HUSAK, 0VERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (2008). 
4. ld at vi. 
5. ld at vii. 
6. ld at viii. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
2011] ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL LAW 85 
• 
several years are the dramatic expansion in the substantive criminal law 
and the extraordinary rise in the use of punishment."7 
• 
Turning to the specific subject of environmental criminal law in 
America, the earliest modem federal felony statutes were not enacted 
until 1980, with additional environmental criminal legislation 
promulgated by the United States Congress during the 1990s.8 Before 
1980, federal criminal provisions for environmental infractions carried 
only misdemeanor penalties, . "which had little deterrent value and 
provided little incentive for prosecutors to invest scarce resources in 
criminal enforcement."9 Serious implementation issues bedeviled the 
7. ld at 3. Other legal theorists have cautioned against overcriminalization. See, e.g., 
HENRY M~ HART, JR. &ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING 
AND APPLICATION OF LAW 35-37 {William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) 
(warning against knee-jerk crirrtinalization as a social policy tool and pointing out more 
sophisticated and appropriate mechanisms of social ordering like licensing, civil fines, and 
statutory contract rights); Robert F. Blomquist, The Good Amencan Legislator: Son1e Legal 
Process Perspectives and Possibilities, 38 AKRON L. REv. 895, 899-900 (2005) (citing HART & 
SACKS, supra, passin1) (discussing potential impacts of new legislation on different actors). 
In recent years, there_ has been an explosion of commentary by individuals at various public 
policy think tanks on the dangers of overcritninalizing American law. See:1 e.g., Over-
Cnininalization of Conduct/Over-Federalization ofCnininal Law: Heanng Before the Subcomm. 
on Crime, Terron:t;m, & Homeland Sec. of the H Comm. on the Judiciary, tilth Cong. 20, 32 
(2009) (statement of Timothy Lynch, Cato lnst.) (proposing refonn of federal criminal law by 
discarding the maxim that "ignorance-of the law is no excuse," restoring the rule of lenity by a 
statutory command, and "[a ]bolish[ing] the doctrine of strict criminal liability"); Exploring the 
National Criminal Justice _Commission A_ct of2009: Hearing Before the Subcomm~ on Crime & 
• 
Dmgs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, lllth Cong. (2009) (statement of Brian W. Walsh, 
Heritage Found.) (lamenting "[t]he rapid expansion of federal criminal law, beyond almost all 
prudential and constitutional limits" and pointing out the hodgepodge ~'of over 4,450 federal 
criminal offenses" scattered throughout the United States Code and Code of Federal Regulations 
in a June 11, 2009 congressional testimony); see also Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization 
Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REv. 703, 708-09 (2004) (describing a "jurisprudential transfot·tna-
tion" in American criminal law at the federal and state levels in recent years that "has been 
exacerbated by the rise- of the modern administrative state" with "criminal penalties in areas 
ranging from environmental protection and securities regulation to product and workplace 
safety"); Brian W. Walsh & Tiffany M. Joslyn, Without Intent· How Congress Is Eroding the 
Criminal Intent Require1nent 1i1 Federal Law, HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 201 0), http://www. 
nacdl.orglpublic.nsf/WhiteCollar/Withoutlntent/$FILE/WithoutlntentReport.pdf (describing how 
Congress's criminal lawmaking is badly broken: poor drafting of criminal statutes, inadequate 
mens rea standards, and overbroad delegations to unaccountable regulators). 
8. See KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME: LAW, POLICY, PROSECUTION 4 
(2008). 
9. ld But see Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2006). "Although the Act was one of the 
first to provide criminal pena1ties for activities that produced pollution, its criminal enforcement 
scheme was weak and prosecutions were few and far between." BRICKEY, supra note 8, at 336 
(footnote omitted) (citing Dollar S.S. Co. v. United States, 10 I F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1939); United 
. ' 
States v. Alaska S. Packing Co. (In re La Merced), 84 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1936)). Examples of 
early federal environmental crimina] prosecutions under this statute include Dollar S.S., I 0 I F.2d 
638 (discharging garbage from a ship into Honolulu harbor), and In re La Merced, 84 F.2d 444 
(discharging oil from a ship into a Seattle, Washington lake). Compare early selective state 
environmental criminal prosecutions under public nuisance charges: People v. Corp. of Albany, 
• 
• 
• 
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federal enforcement of environmental crimes during the 1980s and 
1990s, including a reluctance of prosecutors to prosecute environmental 
crimes, mistrust between different parts of the federal legal bureaucracy, 
and chronic case mismanagement. 10 Moreover, beyond enforcement, 
some scholars contend that the very nature of the environmental crimes 
statutes passed by Congress are flawed because they fail to balance and 
fit three key characteristics of environmental law with the theory of 
criminal law: the "aspirational quality of environmental law," the way 
that environmental law has evolved over time, and the daunting 
complexity of environmentallaw.11 Yet, cutting the other way, given the 
practices . of a few unscrupulous American businesses to gain a 
competitive edge by engaging in the illegal dumping of wastes, or 
• 
violation of other environmental laws, there is "the need for strong 
deterrent measures to override powerful economic incentives to cut 
comers."'2 
The United States' federal environmental criminal laws, 
unfortunately, impose potential liability for conduct without insisting on 
strict mens rea requirements of knowledge of wrongfulness, which is 
common in other criminal statutes. 13 Moreover, as pointed out in a 1991 
law review article, the expansion of "public welfare offenses," for 
environmental and other business regulatory matters, has created the 
-
burgeoning risk of legitimate business actors "becom[ing] unavoidably 
II Wend. 539 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834) (prosecuting city for contributing to the Hudson River 
pollution by dead animal carcasses, mud, and rubbish); Seacord v. People, 13 N.E. 194, 201 (Ill. 
1887) (charging a hog-rendering business for emission of "noxious odors and gases" leading to 
surrounding community air pollution). I rely on BRICKEY, supra note 8, at 336, where these case 
examples are discussed. See DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE WILDERNESS WARRIOR: THEODORE 
ROOSEVELT AND THE CRUSADE FOR AMERICA 242 (2009) (describing the law-and-order attitude of 
Roosevelt in 1891 when he coauthored an essay that attacked corporate greed and urged strict 
criminal penalties for "all poachers and despoilers" of national forest reserves). 
1 0. Richard J. Lazarus, Assimilating Environmental Protection into Legal Rules and the 
Problem with Environmental Cnine, 21 LOY. L.A. L. REV.· 867, 875 (1994) (citing JONATHAN 
TURLEY, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNJV. NAT'L. LAW CTR., PRELIMINARY REPORT ON CRIMINAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROfECfiON BY THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 5-6 (Oct. 19, 1992)). 
11. Se~ e.g., Lazarus, supra note 1, at 2423-24; Richard J. Lazarus, The Reality of 
Environmental Law in the Prosecution of Environmental Cnines: A Reply to the Departn1ent of 
Justice, 83 GEO. L.J. 2539, 2543-44 .( 1995); Christopher H. Schroeder, Cool Analysis ~~us 
Moral Outrage in the Development of Federal Environmental Cnininal Law, 35 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 251, 252-53 ( 1993); cf Kathleen F. Brickey, Environmental Cnine at the Crossroads: The 
Intersection of Environmental and Cnminal Law Theory, 71 TUL. L. REV. 487, 498-504 ( 1996) 
(pointing out that the complexity of environmental law contributes to uncertainty about what is 
compliant behavior and raises the question of the appropriateness of environmental criminal 
liability). 
12. BRICKEY, supra note 8, at 19 . 
13. Lazarus, supra note 10, at 881-83 (''Congress made virtually all ~knowing' and some 
'negligent' violations of environmental pollution control standards, limitations, pertnits, and 
licenses subject to criminal as well as to civil sanctions."). 
• 
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'entangled' with the criminal law."14 As observed by Professor John C. 
Coffee: 
If the disposal of toxic wastes, securities fraud, the filling-in of 
wetlands, the failure to conduct aircraft maintenance, and the causing of 
workplace injuries become crimes that can be regularly indicted on the 
basis of negligence or less, society as a whole may be made safer, but a 
substantial population of the American workforce ... becomes potentially 
entangled with the criminal law. Today, most individuals can plan their 
affairs so as to avoid any realistic risk of coming within a zone where 
criminal sanctions might apply to their conduct. Few individuals have 
reason to fear prosecution for murder, robbery, rape, extortion or any of the 
other traditional common law crimes. Even the more contemporary, white 
collar crimes price fixing, bribery, insider trading, etc. can be easily 
avoided by those who wish to minimize their risk of criminal liability. At 
most, these statutes pose problems for individuals who wish to approach. 
the line but who find that no bright line exists. In contrast, modem 
industrial society inevitably creates toxic wastes that must be disposed of 
by someone. Similarly, workplace injuries are, to a degree, inevitable. As a 
result, some individuals must engage in legitimate professional activities 
that are regulated by criminal sanctions; to this extent, they become 
unavoidably "entangled" with the criminal law. That is, they cannot plan 
their affairs so as to be free from the risk that a retrospective evaluation of 
their conduct, often under the uncertain standard of negligence, will fmd 
that they fell short of the legally mandated standard. Ultimately, if the new 
trend toward greater use of public welfare offenses continues, it will mean 
a more pervasive use of the criminal sanction, a use that intrudes further 
into the mainstream of American life and into the everyday life of its 
citizens than has ever been attempted before. 15 
Furthermore, the responsible corporate officer · doctrine, first 
comprehensively enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in 
United States v. Dotterweich, 16 has exacerbated and further problematized 
the enforcement of federal environmental criminal law against high-
• 
ranking business executives, even when they delegate environmental 
responsibilities to other inferior officers and are typically minimally · 
involved in environmental compliance issues for their business 
organizations.'7 
Finally, a searing critique has emerged in recent years in the United 
States, in light of the overbreadth and vagueness of federal environmental 
criminal statutes, low culpability standards, and enormous prosecutorial 
14. John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawfill" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the 
Disappeanng Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 219-20 (1991 ). 
15. ld 
16. 320 U.S. 277 ( 1943). 
17. BRICKEY, supra note 8, at 68, 78 . 
• 
• 
• 
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discretion,-that the modem state of federal prosecution of individuals and 
businesses for environmental infractions is seriously flawed. •s· This view, 
however, is countered by a more sanguine perspective that takes comfort 
in multiple levels of "administrative scrutiny"19 by enforcement officials 
' 
at the United States Enviro;nmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the 
United States Departn1ent of Justice (DOJ) and a plethora of written 
guidance policies and memoranda.20 
II. ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL LAW IN BRAZIL 
As an alternative to lackluster administrative · enforcement 
. ' 
conducted by Brazilian environmental agencies, "Brazilian· public 
prosecutors became significant actors in the enforcement of environ-
mental laws and regulations in the 1980s."21 As members of the 
Ministerio PUblico, or procuracy, which under the 1988 Federal 
Constitution is "an independent branch of government empowered to 
defend environmental interests and other diffuse and collective 
' 
interests . . . as well as carry out its more traditional prosecutorial 
activities in the area of criminallaw,"22 the Brazilian procuracy at the state 
and federal levels is empowered by law to exercise independent 
discretion in bringing both criminal and civil actions for environmental 
18. Se~ e.g., Lazarus, supra note I, at 2487-88 (citing DotteJWeich, 3~0 U.S. at 285; John 
C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms .Lost· The Blurnng of the Cnminal and Civil Law Models And What 
Can .Be Done About It, 101 YALEL.J. 1875, 1889 (1992); Coffee, supra note 14, at 219-20; Susan 
W. Hedman, Expressive Functions ofCnininal Sanctions in Environmental Law, 59 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 889 ( 1991)) (arguing that the "AI Capone" model, wherein "prosecutors are blindly 
trusted to exploit the full sweep ofthe criminal law only against those who are truly culpable and 
not against the morally innocent," is flawed mainly because of "[t]he demoralization problem_," 
because "many individuals must live in fear of possible criminal prosecution and depend on 
governmental goodwill to maintain their freedom'; in light of the prospect that "many legitimate, 
unavoidable activities are among those subject to possible prosecution"). 
19. See:! e.g., BRICKEY, supra note 8, at 359; Kathleen F. Brickey, The Rhetonc of 
Environmental Crime: Culpability, Discretion:~ and StmcturaiRefoJm, 84 IOWA L. REV: 115, 126-
31 ( 1998); Kathleen F. Brickey, Wetlands Reform and the Criminal EnfOrcement Record· A 
Cautionary Tale; 7 6 WASH~ U. L. Q. 71, 7 6-84 ( 1998). 
20. See:~ e.g., Memorandum from Assistant Adm;r James Strock, Office of Enforcement 
and Compliance Assurance, U.S. EPA, to the Reg'l Adm 'rs (Dec. 3,; 1 990), reviewed in BRICKEY, 
supra note 8, at 341; Memorandum from Earl E. Devaney, Dir. Office of Criminal Enforcement, 
U.S. EPA, The Exercise of Investigative Discretion, to All EPA Employees Working in or in 
Support of the Criminal Enforcement Program ( 1994 ), reviewed in BRICKEY, supra note 8, at 341-
46; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FACTORS IN DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL VIOLATIONS (1991 ), aval'lab/e at http:l/www.justice.gov/enrd/3058.htm; U.S. 
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS MANUAL: PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION 
§§ 9-27.001, . I 10, .230, .300 (1980), avaJ1able at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_ 
room/usarnltitle9/27mcnn.htm. 
21. LESLEY K. MCALLISTER, MAKING LAW MATTER: ENVIRONMENTAL PROfECfJON & 
LEGAL INSTITIJfiONS IN BRAZIL 4 (2008). 
22. ld (intema] quotation marks omitted). 
• 
• 
• 
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infractions.23 "While prosecutors first became involved in environmental 
enforcement in the state of Sao Paulo in the 1980s, prosecutorial activity 
diffused to other states in the 1990s and became the dominant mode of 
. . 
environmental enforcement throughout" Brazil during that decade.24 The 
following is an illustration of this trend: 
In the Amazonian state of Para, lawsuits brought by federal and state 
prosecutors halted the construction of an interstate shipping canal and a 
major hydroelectric plant,. both of which were priority infrastructure 
projects for the state govenunent. Between 1998 and 2002, federal 
prosecutors in Para also filed a series of criminal and civil suits against 
loggers as. well as federal environmental agency officials that exposed 
corruption and fraud in the harvest and sale of mahogany. The case load of 
federal prosecutors in Para is indicative of the priority placed on 
environmental prosecution: in 2001, over half of civil cases and about one-
third of criminal cases concerned environmental harrn.25 
Brazil moved in the direction of prosecutorial enforcement of its 
environmental laws out of frustration; as a developing country, in failing 
to achieve goals of environmental protection through agency regulation.26 
23. Jd at 5. 
24. ld 
25. ld 
26. ld at 1-2. According to a recent digest of Brazilian environmental law: 
Liability, from an environmental law standpoint, and as established in article 225 
of the Federal Constitution, refers to three independent areas: civil, criminal and 
administrative liabiJity . 
According to Federal Law 6,938/81, strict civil liability for environmental 
damages prevails in Brazil It is sufficient that the damage exists and that there is a 
chain of causation between the damage and the polluter or degradation source for the 
obligation to compensate to exist. 
The tendency is to apply the entire risk theory to strict liability, whereupon the 
classic exclusions of liability clauses are not applied to environmental civil liability. 
That is to say, the lawfulness of the practice does not exempt the agent from liability. 
Also, civfl liability is joint and several in environmental law. The liabi1ity for the 
recovery of environmental damages is imputed to all those persons who, in. any way, 
have contributed to the occurrence either directly or indirectly. Federal Law 6,938/81 
defines a polluter as any private or public individual or 1egal entity that is directly or 
indirect1y responsible for an activity that causes environmental degradation . 
There is no definition in law for the concept of environmental damage, although 
the concepts of environmental degradation and pollution are defined .... 
Crimina) liability is established by Federal Law 9,605/98; which prescribes the 
crimes and respective sanctions. Mention should be made to the fact that the Federal 
Government is exclusively responsible for legislating criminal law matters. Penalties 
may be applied to individuals and to legal entities alike. The criminal liability of legal 
entities does not exclude the liability of individual offenders, co-offenders or 
accessories to the fact, covering all those who have contributed, either through acts or 
by om-issions, to the crime, be they officers, administrators, members-of the board of 
directors or technical bodies, auditors, managers, employees or agents. 
For the criminal liability of natural persons the theory of the traditional criminal 
offence is applied, whereas in a concrete case, it is necessary to ascertain the 'dolus' 
.. 
• 
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One American scholar has praised Brazil,s turn toward environmental 
• 
prosecution by arguing that her book ' 
tells an atypical story about environmental law in a developing country. It 
tells the story of how the involvement of legal actors in environmental 
protection in Brazil made environmental law more effective. It finds that 
the involvement of legal institutions particularly prosecutors and 
courts helped develop a robust, effective environmental regulatory 
system in Brazil. Legal institutions brought a degree of legal fidelity and 
sanctioning power that environmental regulatory agencies lacked, and 
prosecution of environmental cases worked to dispel the longstanding 
notion of impunity for environmental hann.27 
and 'culpa' of the agent. With regard to legal entities, though with significant 
resistance from various authors, it has been understood that the principles of strict 
criminal liability apply, to the extent that it would be impossible to ascertain the 
existence of 'dolus' or 'culpa' in an act or omission committed by a legal entity. 
Administrative liability results from the violation of administrative rules, 
submitting the wrongdoer to sanctions of an administrative nature, such as 
admonishment, a simple fine, interdiction of the activity, suspension of benefits and 
others. Administrative liability is based on the capacity of public legal entities to 
impose conduct on citizens. Administrative violations and their respective sanctions 
may be regulated by federal, state or municipal law, in accordance with the exercise of 
the power of each of these entities .... 
Eduardo Damiao Gon¥alves & Tais Cristina Tesser, Brazil, in ENVIRONMENT IN 30 JURISDICTIONS 
WORLDWIDE 23, 25-26 (Carlos de Miguel Perales ed., 2009), http://www.bkbg.eom.br/LinkCiick. 
aspx?fi1eticket=UZDhjHj53dQ%3D&tabid= 121. 
27. McALLISTER, supra note 21, at 2 (emphasis added). For general discussions of 
various aspects of Brazilian environmental law and enforcement, see Antonio Hern1an Benjamin, 
Claudia Lima Marques & Catherine Tinker, The J¥ater Giant Awakes: An Overview of Water 
Law in Brazil, 83 TEX. L. REV. 21 85, 2189 (2005), which provides a "panoramic view of the legal. 
treatment of waters in Brazil beginning with the earliest Jaws of the Portuguese colonial days and 
continuing through modern water legislation and regulation." See Nicholas A. Robinson, Why 
Environmental Legal Developments in Braz11 & China Matter: Comparing Environmental Law 
in Two of Earth s Largest Nations, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW COURSEBOOK 313 
(2006) (describing Brazil's rich and qiverse environment, the relatively recent emergence of 
Brazilian environmental law under a democratic civil law system, the role of the Ministerio 
Publico under recent Brazilian statutory law; and the environmental challenges facing Brazil); 
Colin Crawford & Guilhenne Pignataro, The Insistent (and Unrelenting) Challenges of Protecting 
Biodiversity in Brazll: Finding "The Law That Sticks '; 39 U. MIAMI fNTER-AM. L. REV. I (2007) 
(discussing the details of Brazil's amazing biodiversity and potential legal approaches to 
protecting this ecological heritage); Humberto Dalla Bernardina de Pinho, The Role of the 
Depa1tment of Public Prosecutions in Protecting the Environment Under Braz1lian Law: The 
. Case ofuFavelas" in the City of Rio de Janeiro, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 735 (2008) (discussing the 
evolution of Brazilian environmental law, the role of public prosecutions in protecting the right to 
a healthy environment in the overcrowded slums of Rio, and general principles of Brazilian 
environmental criminal enforcement); Edesi.o Fernandes, La~ Politics and Environmental 
Protection in Braz1l, 4 J. ENVfL. L. 41 ( 1992) (describing general historical background of the Jaw 
and politics of environmental protection in Brazil); Janelle E. Kellman, The Brazilian Legal 
Tradition and Environmental Protection: Friend or Foe, 25 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 145 
(2002) (explaining tensions between Brazilian law and effective environmental protection); 
Cristina Schwansee Romano, Land and Resource Management: Braz1/ian Government Policies 
Towards the Amazon Rain Forest· From a Developmental Ideology to an Environmental 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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But one wonders whether a full bore · national strategy that 
emphasizes environmental criminal enforcement will meet Brazil's 
interests in the second decade of the twenty-first century as Brazil seeks 
to accelerate and deepen its global trading and global business 
connections.28 Could it be that the blunt and unnuanced legal tools of 
environmental criminalization and environmental prosecution will need 
to· be reformed and refined in the coming years?29 
Consciousness?, 1998 Y.B. COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & PoL'v 65, 86 (arguing that during the 1990s 
Brazil was not adequately enforcing its environmental laws that seek to protect the Amazon and 
was ''oblivious to a range of new and insidious threats from timber and agricultural interests"); AI 
Zachary Lazarus, Comment and Case Note, A ~r WoJth Fighting: T.he Ongoing Battle To Save 
the Brazilian Amazon, 9 L. & Bus. REv. AM. 399~ 401-09 (2003) (discussing seven major causes 
of ongoing twenty-first-century deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon: cattle ranching, 
pharn1aceutical finns seeking the discovery of new drugs, development schemes, domestic 
energy needs, timber harvesting, mining, and "Brazil's [i]deology of [d]evelopmentalism"); 
Adriana Lieders, Note, A New Chapter in Brazils Oil Industry: Opening the Market While 
Protecting the Environment, 13 GEo. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 781 (200 I) (discussing an overview of 
oil exploration and environmental compliance in Brazil and urging greater involvement of 
multinational corporate investment). For general environmental law issues in Latin America, see 
Lila Katz de Barrera· Hernandez & Alastair R. Lucas, Environmental Law in Latin Amenca and 
the Caribbean: Overview and Assessment, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 207 ( 1999) (reviewing 
numerous Latin American environmental laws from multiple nations including Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Mexico, and Peru); Guillenno Maim Green, Environmental Legislation in Argentina, 20 
INT'L L. PRACTICUM 159, 159 (2007) ("Environmental protection started developing as a modem 
concept in 1993 with the enactment of the Hazardous Waste Law."); John R. Nolon, Fusing 
Econonuo and Environmental Policy: The Need for Framework Laws in the United States and 
Argentina, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 685 ( 1 996) (urging more coherent and efficient environmental 
laws in Argentina and the United States); Felipe Paez, Environmental Framework Laws in Latin 
America, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 625~ 625 ( 1996) (examining ''the framework [environmental] 
laws adopted by Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela'' in the late twentieth-century); cf. Carolina 
Pett G. Gonc;alves & Alexandre L. Ribeiro do Valle, Brazilian Lc1WS and Climate Changes, .39 
INT'L L. NEws, Fall 2010, at 26 (discussing Brazilian laws potentially impacting climate change); 
Paulo Prada, For Brazi~ It's Finally Ton1orrow: How the Country of the Future Has at Last Made 
It- And What Remains To Be Done, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2010; at Rl (detailing a journalistic 
overview of Brazil's global role and domestic chal1enges ). 
28. Ct Martin N. Baily, Matthew J. Slaughter & Laura D'Andrea Tyson, The Global Jobs 
Competition Heats Up, WALL Sr. J., July 1, 2010, at A 19 (discussing a new study wherein 
corporate leaders say the U.S. business environment for multinational companies is losing its 
edge when compared to countries like China, India, and Brazil, re~ommending "farsighted policy 
initiatives" as essential for Jong-term national economic perfonnance); Brazil's Foreign-Aid 
Programme: Speak Softly and Carry a , Blank Cheque, ECONOMIST, July 17, 2010, at 42 
(describing how Brazil, in search of "soft-power influence,'' is turning itself into one of the 
world's biggest aid donors). 
• 
29. See Henri Acselrad, Grassroots Retraming of Environmental Struggles in Brazil, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN LATIN AMERICA: PROBLEMS, PROMISE, AND PRACTICE 75, 93 (David 
V. Carruthers ed., 2008). As noted by the author: 
• 
The struggles for environmental justice that occur in Brazil may be grouped as 
follows: struggles in defense of rights to culturally specific environments, such as 
those of traditional communities at the front-line of expanding capitalist and market 
activities; struggles in defense of rights to equitable environmental protection against 
market-led socio-territorial segregation and environmental inequality; struggles in 
defense of rights to equitable access to environmental resources and against the 
• 
•. 
• 
• 
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III. THE NORMATIVE FUNCTIONS OF STATE REGULATION OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN THE ERA OF SPREADING 
GLOBALIZATION 
• 
Both the United States and Brazil should be cognizant of 
maintaining and enhancing the key functions of a state in "fulfill[ing] 
their citizens' aspirations for inclusion and development"30 in the 
competitive global milieu of the twenty-first century. While both the 
United States and Brazil are leading free market countries, they should 
both carefully consider the potential impacts of criminal environmental 
law and enforcement on attracting international business investment and 
economic growth. Of ten critical functions of a modem state,31 two are 
• 
,. 
concentration of fertile land, water resources and safe ground in the hands of powerful 
market interests; and also struggles in defense of the rights of future populations. How 
do the movement's representatives make a logical connection between present struggles 
and future rights? By proposing to freeze the mechanisms that shift the environmental 
costs of development onto the poorest sectors of society. What these movements are 
trying to show is that the overall pressure on the environment will continue so long as 
environmental evi Is can be transferred to the poor. 
ld; GLOBAL ISSUES IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 193 n.4 (Stephen C.. McCaffrey & Rachael E. 
Salcido eds., 2009): 
The law in the United States has used criminal provisions in environmental law 
sparingly, although increasingly their utility is being recognized. Another interesting 
approach to biodiversity conservation in Brazil is the designation of certain 
environmental crimes carrying severe fines and potential for imprisonment, including 
provisions for ''crimes against animals" and "crimes against plants." (How does the 
very concept of a "crime against plants" in Brazil differ from the way U.S. laws treat 
destruction of wildlife?) 
A section of Brazilian law delineates "crimes against environmental authorities" 
and includes punishment for those issuing false or misleading infonnation to 
authorities, including withholding infonnation. Further, public officials who issue . 
licenses in violation of environmental laws [in Brazil] face imprisonment for up to 
three years. 
ld; see also Crawford & Pignataro, supra note 27; John Charles Kunich, Fiddling Around While 
the Hotspots Bun1 Out, 14 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 179, 220 (200 I) (noting that provisions of 
Brazilian environmental criminal law "begin to address what has been recognized as a major 
problem in Brazil where much of the responsibility for enforcement lies with state and local 
authori~ies and powerful interests are in opposition" with many public officials in fear for their 
lives). 
30. ASHRAF GHANI & CLARE LOCKHART, FIXING FAILED STATES: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
REBUILDING A FRACTURED WORLD 124 (2008). 
31. ld at 124-63 (discussing ten critical functions of every nation state). These ten 
· functions are (I) rule of law, (2) a monopoly on the legitimate means of violence, (3) admini-
strative control, (4) sound management of public finances, (5) investments in human capital, 
( 6) creation of citizenship rights through social policy, (7) ·provisions of infrastructure services, 
(8) fonnation of a market, (9) management of public assets, and (1 0) effective public borrowing. 
ld While the recent worldwide economic crisis has raised the specter of some deficiencies in 
advanced nations, like the United ·states, Japan, and some European countries, in achieving basic 
economic functions, such as sound management of public finances and effective public 
borrowing, these issues are beyond the scope of this Article. 
• 
• 
• 
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pertinent to the matter of criminal environmental law and enforcement: a 
robust, clear, and fair rule of law,32 and a predictable and functional 
administrative control of key economic sectors of the nation.33 
First, "(t]he rule of law is a 'glue' that binds all aspects of the state, 
the economy, and society."34 In this regard, "[e]ach of the state's functions 
is defined by a specific set of rules that creates the governance 
arrangements decision rights, processes, accountabilities, freedoms, 
and duties for that function. Rules provide both resources that enable 
innovation to occur and constraints that limit behavior."35 The rule of law 
in a country requires system coherence. Thus, 
[ t]he test of coherence ... is .. -· how laws relate to one another as a body of 
rules and the extent to which aligmnent of the system is achieved. When 
new laws are promulgated, they must clearly state which laws are repealed, 
where contradictions exist, which laws have precedence, and how conflicts 
can be resolved.36 
Without a finely-tuned rule of law system .... ·effectively coordinating 
legislative, ·executive, and judicial branches of law · "the legal system 
can ... become a quagmire of contradictory rules and processes."37 Both 
Brazil and the United States need to ponder and address whether their 
respective existing criminal environmental legal systems meet the 
following standard:. 
• 
When rule of law takes hold, it creates a reinforcing loop of stability, 
predictability, trust, and empowerment. First, rule of law stabilizes 
government and holds it accountable. Second, it sets a predictable 
environment in which other players can make plans over the long term. 
Third, it creates confidence in the public, which trusts that, when change is 
necessary, it will take place within a framework of continuity. Finally, it 
empowers those in civil .society and the economy to take initiatives, fonn 
associations, create companies, and work within the confines of the state 
more broadly. It changes the nature of politics from a divisive to a 
II . ' d 38 co ecttve en eavor . . . .. · 
32. ld at 125-28. 
3 3. ld at 131-3 5. 
34. ld at 125. 
35. ld 
36. ld at 126. 
37. ld 
38. ld at 126-27. Indeed, the rule of law in a globalized economy is crucia1: 
Globalization of the economy requires a process of co-production of rules 
involving the state, firrns, and citizens to produce rules that are compatible across 
boundaries. When the Jife chances of individuals depend on their place within global 
corporate chains, the practices of these corporations, ranging from wages to 
environmental issues, become global, not national, concerns. 
ld at 128. 
' 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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Second, and related to the state function of the rule of law, is the 
function of administrative control. When · a nation exhibits 
"dysfunctional administration;'39 adverse consequences arise and a 
"sovereignty gap" emerges.40 "Unpredictable rules," whether they be 
"idiosyncratically interpreted" or arbitrarily "applied" may "generate a 
climate of distrust and contribute to a crisis in state legitimacy."4 ' 
Effective administrativ~ control in the modern globalized economy 
requires "[ c ]ollaborative governance.'~2 Collaborative governing 
arrangements "require[] very different skills from previous types of 
administration, and a fundamental shift by bureaucracy from managing 
microrules to directing complex networks of knowledge, people, and 
resources.'~3 Furthermore, ''accountabilities must be configured 
differently- overseeing networks is quite unlike administering rules.',M 
Electronic governance, or "£-governance," in administrative control 
demands that nations undergo a "revolution in infortnation technology 
and . . . human capital [with] far-reaching implications for organizing 
administration in terms of efficiency, transparency, and accountability.'~5 
Both the United States' and Brazil's administrative control over criminal 
environmental enforcement at the national level raise important questions 
of whether the systems are optimally efficient, transparent, and 
accountable. 
I suggest that both Brazil and the United States could profit in 
enhancing their respective rule of law and administrative control 
functions of sovereignty "build[ing] trust ... and thereby produc[ing] a 
'sovereignty dividend'"46 by undertaking a thorough, top-level review and 
reform of national environmental criminal law and enforcement in their 
respective countries. A series of key questions focused on achieving a 
coherent national philosophy of criminal environmental law in a 
globalized setting as part of a national review and ~ssessment would 
include the following items: 
1. Are criminal sanctions for environmental infractions balanced with 
less draconian law and policy tools like civil fmes, administrative 
39. ld at 133 . 
40. ld at 163. 
41. fd at 133. 
42. ld at 134. 
43. fd 
44. ld 
45. ld 
46. ld at 163. 
• 
• 
• 
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penalties, pollution 
assistance ?47 
prevention. incentives, and technological 
Has criminal environmental 
overcriminalized because either 
penalties have become excessive? 
law and enforcement 
substantive crimes or 
become 
criminal 
In cases where individuals or organizations deserve criminal 
punishment for infractions of important national environmental or 
natural resource laws, will punishment "bring about good 
consequences, such as deterrence of crime or the refonn or 
incapacitation',48 of bad actors "with insufficient concern for the 
interest of others for which one is obligated to act with concem[,]"49 
in a particularized, concrete case? 
What should the measurement of negative desert for environmental 
crime consist of?50 
How does the culpability of an environmental crime compare with 
culpability of other '~white collar" crimes like securities fraud, 
embezzlement, bribery, extortion, or racketeering?51 
47. Se~ e.g., Paying To Save Trees: Last Gasp !Or the Forest, ECONOMIST, Sept. 26, 2009, 
at 93 (discussing the Juma Sustainable Development Reserve in the southeastern comer of the 
Brazilian state of Amazonas where local people are paid by the government, subject to regular 
inspections, to prevent trees from being cut down). 
48. Larry Aiexander, The Phjjosophy· of Criminal Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 815, 816 (Jules Coleman 8i Scott Shapiro eds., 2002) . 
This question assumes a "weak retributivist" approach, because of the imperative of maintaining 
an attractive business environment hi a globalized world of commerce, instead of a "strong 
• 
retributivist" approach under which "negative desert by itself provides a justification for 
punishment, and that punishment of wrongdoers to the extent of their negative desert is 
pennissible in the absence of any predicted good consequences." ld 
49.. Id at 815. 
50. See 10. at 817-19. 
51. Under American environmental criminal law, some judicial opinions have, according 
to Walter D. James, a former environmental prosecutor and expert in American environmental 
law, construed environmental statutes as '"public welfare' statutes requiring no mens rea or a 
lesser mens rea for each element of the crime, even though a 'knowing' mens rea is statutorily 
required to impose criminal culpability." E-mail from Walter D. James, Attomey-at .. Law, to 
author (June 7, 20 I 0, 10:54 CDT) (on file with author). "Under the environmental laws [in the 
United States], apparently innocent conduct can and is criminalized." ld (citing Liparota v. 
United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985)). 
Moreover, Bruce Pasfield, the fonner head of the United States Department of Justice's 
Environmental Crimes Section, ~nd now in private practice, has raised similar concerns . Pasfield 
observes: 
There are pockets of over criminalization that are personality driven (over zealous (sic] 
prosecutors or agents) and several [United States] statutes that have too low a threshold 
for criminal prosecution (the Clean Water Act negligence provision which in some 
circuits has been interpreted as mere simple negligence. The Clean Air Act with a 
similar negligence provision that has yet to be inte.rpreted. The Rivers and Harbors Act 
and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act that have strict liability provisions that can result in 
criminal penalties). The combination of a too Jow a threshold and too aggressive an 
agent or prosecutor can result in over criminalization in specific instances. In general 
though, the system is working as designed and deterring the most egregious conduct. 
• 
• 
•. 
• 
• 
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6. Are unintended, non-reckless violations of environmental norn1s 
worth the social costs of puillshing a non-culpable defendant?52 
7. Do the substantial social costs of detecting, convicting, and punishing 
environmental norm violators ·make sense when compared to the 
social benefits of imposing negative deserts on these violators?53 
8. How should individuation of environmental crimes be defined14 By 
discrete acts constituting spills, leaks, discharges, or emissions? By 
the number of hours or days of violations? 
• 
9. What should be the nature and extent of justification in 
environmental criminal law? "Is (the absence of) justification just 
part of the definition of a[n] [environmental] crime, or are 1 
justifications [in environmental criminal law] best conceptualized as 
distinct from the crimes they override?"55 
E-mail from Bruce Pas field, Attorney-at-Law, to author (June 8, 2010, 10:44 COT) (on file with 
author). Pasfield goes on to opine: 
ld 
I think there is a great deal of confusion both by the [United States Supreme] Court, 
[the United States Departrnent of Justice] and the regulatory community over the 
"knowing'' standard in most of the [United States] environmental statutes. Congress 
did not define this tenn when they enacted these statutes preferring instead to allow 
courts to interpret what the tenn means. Predictably, judges have been all over the map 
in tet n1s of its application. The most confusing piece of the interpretation is the 
application of the public welfare doctrine. Courts have mostly invoked this doctrine to 
claim that the knowing standard in the environmental statutes should somehow be [a] 
lesser intent standard. In reality, there is no need to rely on the public welfare doctrine 
to establish that knowing has a lesser standard tha[n] other intent standards. For 
example, the tenn "willfully" which is used in many criminal statutes outside the 
environmental crimes arena, has always been held to have a higher intent standard 
.tha[n] knowingly. The confusion comes in when the prosecutor invokes concepts such 
as the public welfare doctrine or the responsible corporate officer doctrine to argue that 
an intent standard less than "knowing" should be applied. I said before that the area of 
siinple negligence is one where an aggressive prosecutor may go too far to criminalize 
conduct. I'd add the concepts of public welfare doctrine and responsible corporate 
officers as lega1 concepts, if not applied correctly, can lead to over-criminalization as 
well. 
52. Alexander, supai note 48, at 819. 
53. ld at 819-20; see, e.g., Geraldine Szott Moohr, Defining Overcriminalization 
Through Cost-Benefit Analysis: The Example of Cnininal Copynght Laws, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 
783, 808 (2005). According to Professor Moohr: 
Widespread criminalization exacerbates almost every critical issue in the 
jurisprudence of white collar crime. The issues affected include federalism and the 
federal role in criminal law, prosecutorial discretion and the power of prosecutors to 
obtain expansive interpretations of existing criminal laws, vagueness concerns and the 
preference of Congress to enact open-ended criminal laws, and the use of civil 
standards in evaluating criminal conduct. Yet it is difficult to tell when Congress is 
relying too much on criminal law to control conduct. Using a unifonn definition of the 
tenn "overcriminalization" based on cost-benefit analysis would facilitate· discussion 
not only of overcriminalization but also of its consequences. 
ld at 808. 
54. 
55 . 
. 
Alexander, supra note 48, at 841-42. 
ld at 842. 
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10. Are most environmental crimes, at th·eir essence, nonn violations by 
individuals or by enterprises or both?56 
11. In determining the appropriate and socially optimal punishments for 
individuals who are convicted of environmental crimes, what are the 
factors that should be considered in assessing punishments? 
12. In determining the appropriate and socially optimal punishments for 
enterprises that are convicted of environmental crimes, what are the 
factors that should be considered in assessing punishments? · 
13. What type of punishments are appropriate for environmental crimes 
that are worthy of negative sanction? Shaming punishments? 
Monetary penalties? Forfeiture of property? Incarceration?· 
Conunuruty service? Supplemental environmental projects that 
repair or enhance the environment or natural resources damaged by 
the environmental crime? Supplemental environmental projects that 
repair or enhance other environments or natural resources not 
damaged by the environmental crime? Debannent from bidding on 
• government contracts? Corporate governance restructuring or 
monitoring by govenlffient? 
14. What review and coordinating mechanisms should be instituted in 
assessing the appropriateness and quality of prosecutorial decisions 
to charge (or not to charge) environmental crimes?57 Should 
investigative procedures of prosecutors be subject to greater public 
• ?58 scrutmy. 
15. How should national history and culture drive a nation's system of 
environmental criminal law and the enforcement of these laws?59 
56. See ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME: A READER 1-265, 278-93, 392~98, 608-37 (Rob White 
ed., 2009) (compiling a fascinating assort1nent of essays on conceptualizing environmenta1 
crimes, corporate environmental crime and social inequality, environmental victimology, 
environmental crime in a global context, environmental genocide, and corporate self.;.po1icing and 
the environment among other topics); cf. Andy Pasztor & Daniel Michaels, Prosecutions vex 
Aviation Industry, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2011, at B2 ("International air-safety experts are revving 
up a campaign against criminal treatment of airline accidents after a French magistrate .... 
threatened to prosecute Airbus and Air France over a fatal 2009 crash. The magistrate's move put 
both companies, and potentially some of their senior executives, under formal crimina] 
investigation for involuntary manslaughter in the crash of an Airbus A330 operated by Air France 
as it flew through a violent stonn ·en route to Paris from Rio de Janeiro, killing all 228 people 
aboard."). · 
57. See7 e.g., Michael G. Faure & Hao Zhang, Environmental Cnlninal Law in China~· A 
Critical Analysis, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. l 0,024 (20 11) (explaining environmental criminal law in 
· China as the result of a hodgepodge of nonns found in multiple Jegal sources that are not precise 
or clear, which creates gaps and weaknesses and requiring a real need for refonn). 
58. Cf Editorial, Obama s Political 011 Fund,. WALL ST. J., J\lne IS, 20 l 0, at A 16 ("The 
BP oil spill is a1ready a calamity for the Gu1f Coast ecosystem and economy, but now that 
• 
Washington is looking to deflect all political blame it cou1d also became [sic] a disaster for the 
rule of law" because of the Attorney General's public announcement of a ''criminal probe."). 
59. See, for example, Stephan C. Thaman, Russia, in THE HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE 
CRIMINAL LAW 414, 446 (Kevin Jon Heller & Markus D. Dubber eds., 2011 ), describing 
seventeen Russian "ecological" crimes involving three main categories: 
• 
• 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
In order to create a sovereignty dividend encompassing the rule of 
· law and fair administrative control in the global setting of economic 
competition between nations, both the United States and Brazil should 
rethink and reform national environmental criminal law and enforcement 
within their respective countrie~. To do so, fifteen questions of legal 
philosophy need to be answered . 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
(I) violations of rules dealing with improper handling of dangerous substances, such as 
biological agents, toxins, and radioactive materials; (2) acts infringing on specific 
environmental resources: water, atmosphere, soil, forest, subsoil, continental shelf, and 
specially protected natural territories and objects; and (3) acts infringing on flora and 
f~una, biological diversity, and preservation of the biosphere. 
ld Importantly: 
ld 
The need for strong environmental protection laws in Russia stems from an 
acute awareness among the population and the legislature of the devastating effects of 
Soviet industrialization, which included not only the ChemobyJ disaster in 1986 but a 
similar nuclear leak in Chelyabinsk region in 1957, massive oil spills in the Russian 
north, and the disappearance of. the A~ I Sea in Soviet central Asia, just to name a few. 
As of 1995, 40 percent of all Russian inland waters were polluted. 
• 
• 
